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The practice of law, like the game of football, reflects and
embodies the valued behaviors and assumptions of our society: op-
position, competition, offense/defense, winning/losing, and strate-
gic deception. The referees, umpires, and line judges of football
become judges and juries in the law courts, where prosecuting and
defense attorneys vie to win cases, substituting linguistic maneu-
vers for the muscle and violence of football. Both are conceptually
related in our minds for they draw internal coherence from meta-
phorical concepts that equate them with war: ARGUMENT IS
WAR, FOOTBALL IS WAR. This parallelism suggests that our so-
ciety is preoccupied with the idea of war, if not its reality.
For Feminists' committed to the practice of law, these con-
ceptual equations must result in a conflict of values: Feminism, on
the one hand, which counsels against war, violence, and competi-
* Different versions of this article have been used in presentations during the
course of its development: Change: Who Needs It?, Wimmin's Coffeehouse,
Minneapolis, Aug. 1983; a workshop on language and consciousness, Midwest
Lesbian-Feminist Conference, Aug. 1983. This version was presented at the
Midwest NWSA Conference, Apr. 19, 1985.
** Julia Penelope is an internationally-recognized scholar in linguistics and
lesbian studies. Her diverse research interests include sexism in English, double-
speak, lesbian literature, and feminist literary theory. Her essays have appeared in
numerous journals, among them Linguistics, Foundations of Language, College
English, Common Lives/Lesbian Lives, and Lesbian Ethics. She's currently work-
ing on a dyke trivia game, a book of found goddesses (with Morgan Grey), and
books on strategies of language use and what feminists can learn from football.
1. Like other rules and laws in our society, those governing the use of upper
and lower case letters to begin words are arbitrary and provide us with an opportu-
nity to exercise our own predilections. The capitalization of proper names, the
months of the year, and the first person singular pronoun, I (but not you, we, or
they) is a typographical convention. Capitalizing the first letter of a word informs
the reader that the writer assigns special importance and respect to it. e.e. cum-
mings, for example, shocked readers by using a lower case "i" for the first person
singular pronoun and capitalizing only the words he thought were important. More
recently, Andrea Dworkin has fought with mainstream editors for her preferred ty-
pography. In this essay, I capitalize Feminist and Feminism in order to signal the
importance I assign to the terms.
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tion, and the heteropatriarchal 2 legal system, which assumes such
activities as inevitable and necessary. How does a Feminist, com-
mitted to social change, get up every day to engage in legal battles,
fighting in the courts to promote ideas inimical to the system it-
self? Examining the metaphorical concepts that reflect this con-
tradiction suggests ways to maintain a positive perspective without
compromise or cop-out.
First, we can acknowledge we are "at war." The "battle of
the sexes" is not an accidental description. We didn't declare the
war, but we fight it daily, regardless. (Some call it a "struggle,"
perhaps, thereby euphemizing its violence.) Second, we can admit
we've "chosen sides" in this war, for Feminist values contradict the
values of the heteropatriarchy. Third, having chosen "our side,"
we can distinguish "us" from "them." Making that distinction en-
ables us to exploit the system for our own purposes; failure to do
so traps us in guilt, self-recrimination, and tentativeness. Most im-
portantly, we must realize we deal differently with members of
our own "team" than we do with opponents, and that is my subject
here. Much depends on our ability to compete successfully on hos-
tile turf while, simultaneously, we endeavor to divest ourselves of
the very conceptual patterns our success depends upon.
Feminism, it has always seemed to me, sets forth, as one of its
essential properties, personal change. The explicit purpose of the
consciousness-raising groups of the early Second Wave 3 was the
identification and validation of each wimon's4 experiences of op-
2. Readers may be familiar with the word patriarchal, which denotes a society
in which men rule, but the term heteropatriarchal may cause some readers to balk.
I coined the term in 1982 because Canadian friends needed it for what they were
talking about in an essay. Since then, I've adopted it myself because it clearly de-
notes two aspects of our patriarchy that I don't like. The prefix hetero - means,
among other things, 'different'. In our society, the differences among us form the
basis for many of our prejudices: color, age, height, intelligence, sex, class, weight,
etc. Being "different," deviating from the white, male, heterosexual "norm," puts
one at risk. In this sense, I use heteropatriarchy to emphasize how our differences
are used to divide and oppress us. More familiar is the word heterosexual, which is
generally defined as "love of the opposite sex." (Note the equation of love and sex.)
My use of heteropatriarchy is also intended to remind my readers that "compulsory
heterosexuality" (from the title of Adrienne Rich's article, Compulsory Heterosexu-
ality and Lesbian Existence, 5 Signs 631 (1980)) is a necessary corollary of our soci-
ety. Men rule; wemyn are their chattel and legitimate prey. Heterosexual
programming maintains and perpetuates the status quo.
3. The Second Wave of Feminism is the present "wave" which began in the
late 1960's. The First Wave refers to Feminist activism during the 19th century.
4. I adopt here the spellings of wimon and wemyn from Old and Middle Eng-
lish as given in 12 Oxford English Dictionary (1961). The word woman originated
as a compound, wif + man(n), during the Old English period, about the same time
that wif, which originally referred to a female human being, was semantically nar-
rowed to mean 'a woman bound to a man'. Having deprived themselves of a female
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pression within the heteropatriarchy. The discovery and naming
of our experiences revealed patterns of oppression and showed us
how we had internalized oppressive patterns that interfered with
our ability and desire to act on our own behalf as effective, autono-
mous agents. Once a wimon becomes aware of how conventional
female behaviors (such as passivity, dependence, coyness, niceness)
function oppressively to keep her "in her place," she's ready to un-
dertake the process of unlearning the heteropatriarchal program
that structures her life.
Personal change necessarily is antecedent to and is the basis
for the activism that initiates social change. The creation and con-
tinued use of the word Feminism as a label assumes the existence
of an ideology, a way of perceiving and framing the world, that dis-
tinguishes it from all other conceptual frameworks and ideologies.
Even overlap and fuzziness in political concerns require identifi-
able, separate ways of reacting to and describing events in the
world. If this were not so, if Feminism weren't distinct from other
ideologies, then the use of the label as a self-description would be
meaningless. Likewise, if Feminism didn't require change in our
lives, our ideas, and our behaviors, the label would be meaningless.
Becoming a Feminist, then, calling oneself a Feminist, announces
one's voluntary acceptance of the necessity for change, one's com-
mitment to change, not just for the rest of the world, but in one-
self. Underlying that announcement is a negative judgment about
the "world as it is" and the world as men describe and understand
it. Claiming the label Feminist also says, "I am not satisfied with
who/what I have understood myself to be up to this moment, and I
plan to become other than who/what I am in the course of time by
critical, self-examination."
When a wimon claims the label Feminist for herself, she sets
generic, speakers of Old English created the compound wiman(n). I believe this
compound was based on the xtian precept that wemyn derived from men (as ribs),
since it appears after the christianization of Britain. For further discussion, see my
two earlier articles, Julia Penelope Stanley & Cynthia McGowan, Woman and
Wife: Social and Semantic Shifts in English, 12 Papers in Linguistics 491-502
(1979) and Julia Penelope, Lexical Gaps and Lexicalization: A Diachronic Analysis,
in Proceedings of the Tenth LACUS Forum 296-304 (1983). (The acronym LACUS
refers to the Linguistic Association of Canada and the United States.)
Prior to the standardization of spelling required by the print medium in the
14th century, numerous spellings of woman and women were acceptable, among
them wimon and wemyn. This particular instance of "standardization" reminds us
that we are the derivative sex, and some radical Feminists, such as Monique Wittig,
argue (convincingly, I think) that continued use of the word woman helps to per-
petuate our subordinate status. Monique Wittig, One is Not Born a Woman, 1 Fem-
inist Issues 46 (Winter 1981). In an effort to avoid overburdening my readers with
an unfamiliar vocabulary, but hoping to alert them to the dubiousness of the word
itself, I have opted to use the nonstandard, original spellings for their shock value.
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herself against the world of men, even when she denies that is
what she's done. She denies the validity of their descriptions, defi-
nitions, structures, and ways of thinking, and asserts that she in-
tends to replace man-made conceptions with her own and those of
other wemyn. As many of us know by now, this replacement pro-
cess takes time and a commitment to dis-covering and identifying
those changes we want to make. Furthermore, not just "any
changes" will do, and we don't agree on which changes are desira-
ble because, even though we may call ourselves "Feminists," we
don't seem to have a common set of values. That is, change, in or-
der to be both feasible and credible, must be motivated. There have
to be systematic principles, agreed-upon values, that determine
which changes we'll make and provide an internally consistent ra-
tionale for their necessity. I doubt that any of us would claim that
any change is "good" simply because it's "change." Until we make
explicit the underlying principles that distinguish "good" changes
from "bad" ones within a Feminist ideological framework, we'll
continue to be baffled by our disagreements and disillusioned by
our inability to communicate with each other about our
differences.5
After we've identified those changes we can agree on, it takes
still more time and commitment to effect specific changes in our
lives. There is, then, a time lag inherent in this process. In spite
of our best efforts and intentions, when we come together to work
as "Feminists" on wemyn's issues, masculist6 perceptions and de-
scriptions persist in our behaviors. Because each of us finds her-
self in a different phase of the process of change at any given time,
masculist perceptions and behaviors divide us and keep us from
5. An excellent example of this conflict is the Feminist Anti-Censorship
Taskforce (FACT) brief filed against the MacKinnon-Dworkin antipornography or-
dinance in Indiana. See Brief Amici Curiae of Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce,
American Booksellers Assoc., Inc. v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984),
affd, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affd, 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986). The name adopted
by the task force is indicative of the misunderstanding which exists between the
two groups. Censorship is not the issue in the antipornography ordinance. The is-
sue is whether wemyn suffer harm as a result of pornography. The research leads
to the conclusion that they do. See generally Margaret Baldwin, The Sexuality of
Inequality: The Minneapolis Pornography Ordinance, 2 Law & Inequality 629
(1984). The ordinance provides a civil cause of action for individual wemyn who
have been harmed by pornographic materials. Id. at 630; Andrea Dworkin, Against
the Male Flood. Censorship, Pornography and Equality, 8 Harv. Women's L.J. 1, 22
(1985). The antipornography groups and the anti-censorship groups are working at
cross purposes.
6. Masculist, rather than masculinist, is the appropriate antonym of Feminist,
for it refers to the cultural, rather than biological, differences between the sexes
that rationalize the subordination of wemyn. A "masculist," female or male, sup.
ports and defends the values of patriarchal culture.
[Vol. 4:379
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working together because we aren't aware of what's happening be-
tween us. Our commitment to on-going personal change means
that no one of us can assume that her conceptual framework at a
given moment is permanent or absolute in any sense. If we are,
indeed, "in process," it is a mistake to regard ourselves and other
wemyn as "products," fixed and unchanging.
I'm assuming here that we do share common values and that
we do want to work together toward social changes that will eradi-
cate oppression based on our biological sex. If we do want to work
together, we must become more consciously aware of how old be-
haviors continue to impede our efforts. Our use of English reveals
our conceptual framework as we speak, as surely as our body lan-
guage betrays our allegiances. Each of us must learn to hear our-
selves as we speak, to monitor our language use as we describe
events and individuals. We have to care about what we say.
Identifying some of the most prevalent masculist descriptions
that promote male-identified behaviors and ways of thinking and
making them explicit will, I believe, make it possible for us to
work together more consciously on eliminating such descriptions
and behaviors from our interactions. This process of change may
then increase the likelihood of our success in accomplishing both
short-range and long-range political goals as we learn different
ways of interacting with each other.
Metaphorical Concepts
A first step in the processes of unlearning old thought pat-
terns and adopting new ones is identifying the masculist descrip-
tions we rely on. Here, I'll focus on one type of masculist
description, metaphors, and discuss the metaphorical concepts that
underlie them.7 Metaphorical concepts are abstract connections
between unlike objects or events; we've learned these abstract con-
nections as we've learned language, from social interactions of var-
ious kinds. Just as we're socialized as we learn a language, so, too,
we acquire the social values embedded in metaphorical concepts.
Among the metaphorical concepts we've learned are "structural
metaphors," such as ARGUMENT IS WAR and LANGUAGE IS A
7. Throughout my discussion, I rely on certain concepts used by George Lakoff
and Mark Johnson. See George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By
(1980). In particular, I've adopted their distinction between metaphorical concepts
(always represented by capital letters) and metaphors, the expressions we use in
speech, and their classification of metaphorical concepts as structural, orientational,
or ontological (the latter isn't relevant to this paper). Even though I don't think
their categorizations or representations are adequate, I've retained them here.
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CONTAINER, s and "orientational metaphors," such as UP IS
GOOD/DOWN IS BAD and FORWARD IS GOOD/BACKWARD
IS BAD. A metaphorical concept may underlie numerous meta-
phorical descriptions.9
A structural metaphor "structures" one concept in terms of
another, as in the equation X IS Y, where X stands for the object/
event being described, and Y stands for the descriptive term. The
semantic features and associations attached to the Y term are
transferred conceptually to the X term. If I say, for example,
JOHN IS A GORILLA,10 in which X is "John" and Y is "a go-
rilla," the semantic features of gorilla, along with our associations
with the term, are now conceptually attached to the X term,
"John." The metaphorical assertion, JOHN IS A GORILLA, as-
cribes to John the features ANIMATE and NONHUMAN, along
with the cultural associations we've learned about gorillas, e.g.,
"very big," "very strong," "mean," "vicious," "dirty," "aggressive,"
etc. (Note that it doesn't matter at all that gorillas are actually
clean, gentle (unless cornered), and social beings.) What the meta-
phor establishes is an identity relation between John and our soci-
8. LANGUAGE IS A CONTAINER is our primary metaphorical concept for
talking about linguistic communication. Michael Reddy has identified this as the
Conduit Metaphor, and explored its intellectual and pedagogical ramifications in
his article, The Conduit Metaphor-A Case of Frame Conflict in Our Language
about Language, in Metaphor and Thought 284 (Andrew Ortony ed. 1979). It's a
complex metaphor, combining three distinct metaphorical equations (as repre-
sented by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson):
IDEAS (or MEANINGS) ARE OBJECTS
LANGUAGE IS A CONTAINER
COMMUNICATION IS SENDING
Lakoff & Johnson, supra note 7, at 10. Diverse phrases are derived from this meta-
phorical concept, all of them familiar: "I can't put my thoughts into words," "His
words carry little meaning," "They don't know how to convey their ideas," "I don't
get your meaning." Id. at 10-11.
I discuss the Conduit Metaphor and another metaphorical concept, central to
the popular thesis that language (any language) must remain "pure," LANGUAGE
IS A WOMAN, in Users and Abusers: On the Death of English, in The English Lan-
guage Today 80-91 (Sidney Greenbaum ed. 1985). The social and political conse-
quences of LANGUAGE IS A WOMAN are illustrated in an earlier article, Julia
Penelope, Two Essays on Language and Change: I" John Simon and the "Dragons
of Eden ," 44 College English 848-54 (1982).
9. For example, Francine Hardaway explores the many ways the metaphorical
concept LIFE IS A GAME appears in daily conversations. Francine Hardaway,
Foul Play: Sports Metaphors as Public Doublespeak, in Speaking of Words: A Lan-
guage Reader 167-72 (James MacKillop & Donna Woolfolk Cross eds. 1982).
10. The metaphor, "John is a gorilla," is a popular one in the literature on the
subject of metaphors, but my discussion here draws on observations about semantic
"interactions" in metaphorical statements made by John R. Searle, Metaphor, in
Metaphor and Thought 92 (Andrew Ortony ed. 1979). In Searle's article, however,
it's "Richard is a gorilla." Id. at 97.
[Vol. 4:379
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ety's STEREOTYPED IDEA of what gorillas are "like."11
One of the patriarchal metaphorical concepts that we con-
tinue to act out is ARGUMENT IS WAR. By accepting the iden-
tity relation of this metaphorical concept, we think of arguments
as inherently violent conflicts, and we behave, when we're arguing
with someone, as though we're dealing with an "opponent." The
following metaphorical descriptions illustrate some of the ways
ARGUMENT IS WAR underlies how we talk and think about
arguments.
Her claims are indefensible.
She attacked every weak point in my argument.
Your criticisms are right on target.
I demolished her arguments.
I've never won an argument with her.
If you use that strategy, she'll wipe you out.
She shot gaping holes in my argument.
Such examples show how we use the metaphorical concept, AR-
GUMENT IS WAR, which we've learned from patriarchal culture.
The process of arguing, of debating different perspectives, is con-
ceived of as though it were a war.
In a law court, awareness of this metaphor can only help us.
The American legal system is an "adversarial system" in which
words replace flak and shrapnel. 12 Our effectiveness as lawyers
depends upon our assimilation of the adversarial model. To ignore
the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphorical concept in the legal con-
text disarms us. Because the legal system assumes arguing is con-
flict, we must be prepared to parry the assumptions imposed by
the dominant description of reality. If we continue to argue with
each other as though ARGUMENT IS WAR is an accurate model
for conceiving of disagreements, we will perpetuate emotional pain
11. The pejorative uses of such metaphors presuppose that human beings are
superior to all other species (this attitude is called "speciesism"), and those in
power often use other animals as metaphors in order to dehumanize whoever they
wish to persecute. Familiar examples include calling wemyn "chicks," "dogs,"
"cats," or "cows." In Nazi Germany, Jews were identified as subhuman by equating
them with insects or pests, thereby rationalizing the attempt to eradicate them.
This metaphor surfaces in a letter from Himmler to one of his top SS officials (circa
1942), where the official is told: "The occupied Eastern territories are to become
free of Jews." Lucy Dawidowicz, The War Against the Jews 1933-1945, at 129
(1975).
12. The meaning of plaintiff and defendant exemplifies the ARGUMENT IS
WAR metaphor in the legal context. Plaintiffs are those who "prosecute the ac-
tion." McFadin v. Simms, 309 Mo. 312, 328, 273 S.W. 1050, 1053 (1925). "The word
'defendant' as used in legal controversies implies an attitude of defense; such per-
son need only stand and repel the assaults of his [sic] adversary." Henderson v. Ap-
plegate, 203 S.W.2d 548, 552 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (citation omitted).
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and violence among ourselves because those are the features im-
posed on arguing by the metaphorical concept.
Persisting in its use to describe disagreements among our-
selves hinders our attempts to build the trust necessary for cooper-
ation. Arguing itself is perceived as a "bad thing"; not agreeing
with other wemyn becomes something scary, frightening, danger-
ous, something potentially painful, and therefore, to be avoided.
When we do argue with each other, we perceive ourselves as hav-
ing something to "lose" or "win." If we "lose," we're likely to per-
ceive ourselves as having "been beaten," as being made to look
inferior or becoming powerless. If we win, on the other hand,
we're prone to feel powerful or superior to whoever "lost." This
''win or lose" approach to arguing traps us into thinking of other
wemyn as "opponents," "enemies," even "antagonists," and so we
cast ourselves in the roles of "offense" and "defense," and ascribe
"weakness" and "strength" to our differing beliefs. Abstract ideas
and values are treated as though they were concrete, tangible ob-
jects like chairs or territory, something to be taken away from us
or another wimon. Indeed, the typical patriarchal justification for
war is the acquisition of new territory from someone else or the
"protection" of territory already possessed. Since very few wemyn
have "territory" to be taken away, it's usually our self-concepts
and personal esteem that end up being "at stake" in arguments.
For contrast, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson suggest that
we'd think and act very differently when we argued if we lived in
a society where we'd learned that ARGUMENT IS DANCE.13
ARGUMENT IS DANCE suggests ways of behaving that are very
different from those imposed by ARGUMENT IS WAR. Instead of
conceiving of ourselves as "combatants" or "enemies," we'd be
willing participants in arguments, performers working together to
create an artistic, pleasant event. We'd think of the desirable out-
come of an argument as a balanced, aesthetically satisfying experi-
ence for everyone involved, rather than as the "victory" of one
wimon "over" another. In order to achieve such an experience,
we'd cooperate with each other in the development of our observa-
tions, instead of antagonistically "facing off" across imagined lines
that distinguish "friends" and "allies" from "enemies." In this
other culture, arguing would be a pleasant, mutually-satisfying
pastime to be sought and cultivated rather than avoided. We
wouldn't argue among ourselves in order to "win," but to create
from the different points of view an integrated composition, the
13. Lakoff & Johnson, supra note 7, at 4-5.
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process of the dance itself. We can choose the language that suits
the context of our involvement.
Metaphorical Functions
Metaphors seem to be essential to our thinking, our ability to
conceptualize and frame new ideas. Abandoning metaphors ut-
terly would linguistically impoverish us, I believe. Failure to iden-
tify and understand the favored metaphors of our society would
hamper, and has hampered, our ability to reconceive our lives. We
need to remain conscious of the cultural metaphors that structure
our thinking and actions, and to construct new metaphors that re-
flect and promote the changes we seek, such as the ARGUMENT
IS DANCE metaphor suggested by Lakoff and Johnson.14
As we set about this process, there are two functions of meta-
phorical concepts we need to remain aware of. First, they're SYS-
TEMATIC. Once we begin to look for metaphorical concepts and
become aware of them, we very quickly realize they interact with
and reinforce each other. Because we live in a materialistic soci-
ety, money, resources, finance, valuable commodities, and the scar-
city of such things figure prominently in metaphors. One of our
most common metaphorical concepts is TIME IS MONEY, as the
following descriptions illustrate.
You're wasting my time.
This gadget will save you hours.
I don't have the time to give to that project.
She spends her time wisely.
Your negligence has cost me an hour.
I've invested a lot of time in our relationship.
You spend too much time bar-hopping.
Is that project worth your while?
We're running out of time.
We're living on borrowed time.
Because, in our society, TIME is treated as a VALUABLE
COMMODITY, as a RESOURCE, we act as though it were some-
thing necessarily limited, to be doled out or allocated. Because
wemyn, as a class, have so little money, however, we usually sub-
stitute ENERGY for TIME in our descriptions. We talk often, for
example, about "investing our energies," "wasting our energies,"
"putting our energies into each other," as though our energy was a
concrete object and our projects, including relationships with other
14. For additional suggestions and analysis of other metaphorical concepts, see
The Mystery of Lesbians, 2 Lesbian Ethics 29-67 (1985). Both the body and the




wemyn, were containers into which we "put" our energies. Like
the ARGUMENT IS WAR concept, the TIME/ENERGY IS
MONEY metaphor also encourages us to think of time and energy
as valuable objects to be "protected" from "theft" and other "pred-
atory" activities. In this way, we treat our time and energy as
though they are territory we need to defend against unwanted in-
cursions. When we talk about "investing" time or energy in
projects or other wemyn, we also set ourselves up to expect a "pay-
off" or "profit." We expect to "get back what we put in," thereby
setting ourselves up for disappointment and disillusionment. Fem-
inism isn't a financial enterprise or a business deal, and neither are
interactions with other wemyn. If we continue to think of our en-
ergy as money or as a valuable resource, we'll also keep behaving
as though either or both were subject to scarcity.
Which brings me to the second aspect of metaphorical con-
cepts we need to be aware of: they not only highlight specific fea-
tures of an object or situation, they hide others as well. As we pick
and choose among potential descriptions, we need to remember
that metaphorical concepts are only partial descriptions of our
perceptions. We cannot forget this, nor can we believe that our
metaphorical descriptions are both true and complete. If we con-
tinue to rely on the metaphorical concepts learned from our cul-
ture, and refuse to question their usefulness and accuracy, our
possible behaviors will be limited and constrained by how we un-
derstand an event or emotion.
For example, those who believed the selection of Geraldine
Ferraro as Walter Mondale's vice-presidential candidate ("running
mate") in 1984 was politically significant would have known better
if they'd understood the insult implied by New York governor
Mario Cuomo's description of her (borrowed from Shakespeare's
Romeo and Juliet): "She will be the moon to Mondale's sun." The
sun, Mondale, is the active, life giving source. The moon, Ferraro,
is passive. The speaker implicitly communicates that Ferraro does
not stand on her own. Rather, she, like the moon, reflects the
sun's light. By attending to the hidden as well as the high-lighted
implications of structural metaphors, and remaining aware of the
systematicity of their connections, we can learn more than the
speaker intends to communicate.
Orientational Metaphors
Orientational metaphors, unlike structural metaphors, are de-
rived from our physiognomy as human beings and the way our
bodies are oriented spatially with respect to the perceived horizon.
[Vol. 4:379
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We are bipedal, standing on our hind legs so that our bodies are
vertical with respect to the earth. Our faces contain both of our
eyes, positioned side by side, with our noses and our mouths on the
same surface. While it's certainly possible that these traits serve
some purpose of survival, they also determine how we perceive the
world and ourselves in relation to it. ORIENTATIONAL META-
PHORS, furthermore, make value judgments about spatial position
with respect to our own: UP IS GOOD but DOWN IS BAD,
HAPPY IS UP but SAD IS DOWN, and IN FRONT IS GOOD but
IN BACK IS BAD.
UP IS GOOD/DOWN IS BAD
She rose quickly in their esteem.
Her influence fell.
I certainly look up to her.
They look down on weirdos.
HAPPY IS UP/SAD IS DOWN
I'm feeling up these days.
She's been down lately.
Her smile boosted my spirits.
She's really high today!
My spirits sank when I saw them.
IN FRONT IS GOOD/TN BACK IS BAD
I like everything up front.
Don't do anything behind my back.
They're really forward-looking.
Don't be so backward.
She's trying to get ahead.
Nebraska lags behind every other state.
Instead of relating one term to another, as the structural met-
aphors do, orientational metaphors place a negative or positive val-
uation on one spatial relationship rather than another. In our
culture, whatever we conceive of as "in front of us" is positively val-
ued, while those events/objects thought of as "behind us" are nega-
tively valued. What we can see, what is known is "good," while what
we cannot see, the unknown, is "bad." In this way, we're taught to
fear the unknown, to avoid taking risks, and to rely on our percep-
tions, even when additional information contradicts them. Things
we describe as being "up" or "high" are "good," while those that
are "down" or "low" are bad. Because we perceive the world as
being in front of us, we believe that "facing" something is good,
and "not facing" something is bad. We talk about "being able to
face someone or something," "facing the issues," "facing reality,"
"facing the music," or failing "to face an issue squarely." (Com-
mon usage of the verb to confront also relies on this orientational
metaphor.) In a hostile situation, we say we "face off." If we were
physically different, if our eyes were on stalks, or could swivel like
1986]
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those of the praying mantis, or were placed on either side of our
head, like those of dogs, or if both eyes were on one side, like those
of the flounder, or multi-faceted, like those of flies, the metaphori-
cal descriptions that "made sense" to us would be very different!
We need to begin to conceive of ourselves in relation to the
world in very different ways because orientational metaphors un-
derlie many of our sizeist, classist, and able-bodied assumptions. In
our society, TALL IS GOOD but SHORT IS BAD, HAVING
MONEY IS UP, NOT HAVING MONEY IS LOW, SEEING IS
GOOD but NOT SEEING IS BAD. One branch of western philos-
ophy is based on the metaphorical use of perception, and the equa-
tion of sightedness with intelligence and understanding permeates
our conversation. We may have expunged the more obvious meta-
phors, e.g., "blind as a bat," "up a blind alley," "blind with rage,"
but I still hear a lot of expressions that incorporate able-bodied as-
sumptions that exclude blind people: "Oh, I see," "She has a lot of
vision (or foresight)," or "I can do it with my eyes closed" (as
though the act was insignificant).
Furthermore, and more importantly for Feminists, the sex-
ism in our society has institutionalized these orientational meta-
phors. As a consequence, a personality or physical trait regarded
as "good" for a man is simultaneously judged as "bad" for a
wimon. It's a "good" thing in our culture for men but a "bad"
thing for wemyn to occupy space. Consequently, tall men are val-
ued, but tall wemyn aren't; short wemyn are positively valued, but
short men aren't. The same can be said about size. BIG IS GOOD
only if the "big" person is male; if it's a wimon, SMALL IS GOOD.
The widths of chairs made for each sex reflect this valuation, as do
numerous instances of behavior: the way we sit (wemyn all drawn
up, occupying as little space as possible, men all spread out and
taking up as much room as possible), the way we talk (wemyn
softly, men loudly-men can occupy an extremely large space with
their voices alone), the way we walk (small, dainty steps for
wemyn, large strides for men), etc. BEING A WIMON IS DOWN,
BEING A MAN IS UP in our society.
My discussion here has barely begun to show how thoroughly
our everyday language, which we take for granted and of which
we're largely unconscious, reflects and perpetuates heteropa-
triarchal values. Hopefully I've said enough, however, to suggest
the urgency of actively seeking different ways of talking to and
about other wemyn. If we don't act to change how we talk about
the world, we certainly will not feel compelled to change the way
we perceive the world and ourselves as agents in the world.
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What's more, we can communicate very well without these meta-
phorical conceptions. Most of them are "dead metaphors" or
cliches, and perpetuating their use is banal and mediocre, at the
least. If we refuse the challenge to our preconceptions and atti-
tudes, we also deny the transformative potential of Feminism as an
ideology, and make our use of the label mere cant.
How seriously are we committed to change? How can we find
different ways of talking to each other? How willing are we to
learn new ways of behaving in situations, especially scary ones?
We can't continue to use masculist concepts as though it's OK to
talk in their language. If we do, we'll never dis-cover our own
meanings and the new conceptualization of the world those mean-
ings would necessitate. We can no longer persist in taking the
"easy way." Let's not fool ourselves: the language that comes most
easily and quickly to mind is heteropatriarchal language-mascu-
list words, syntax, intonations, and concepts. Instead, we must
start by taking the long route to saying what we want to say, no
matter how ridiculous we may feel at first when we try saying
something different from what we've learned. We have to be will-
ing to "go around" the available words, the labels given to us by
our culture. This process will require us to cooperate with each
other as we learn how to talk and think differently. We may have
to use phrases, clauses, even one or more sentences in order to talk
about something our culture provides a single word for, and this
effort can be tedious. But what cannot be forgotten or ignored is
that the process of finding different ways to talk is a necessary
prerequisite to reshaping what and how we think.
1986]

